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The Fragility of Reality:  
 
Luc Boltanski in Conversation with  
Juliette Rennes and Simon Susen1 
 
Luc Boltanski, Juliette Rennes, and Simon Susen  
 
(Translated by Simon Susen) 
 
Luc Boltanski is a sociologist and Directeur d’études at the École des Hautes 
Études en Sciences Sociales. Born in 1940, he is the author of 15 books, which 
are based on various field studies and transcend disciplinary boundaries: nursing, 
reproduction, abortion, the professional world of cadres, humanitarian issues,  and 
management – to mention only a few of the topics covered in his works. His 
sociology focuses on the analysis of normative orders and resources mobilized  by 
human actors in order to preserve, or challenge, particular sets of social 
arrangements. As reflected in the debates sparked by his ‘pragmatic turn’, the 
conceptual tools that Boltanski has developed in his numerous  studies have  had a 
profound impact upon contemporary sociology – both in France and beyond. His 
intellectual trajectory is shaped by doubts, methodological revisions, and 
theoretical shifts, illustrating that Luc Boltanski is a sociologist who is attentive to 
the construction processes and uncertainties of social life. 
 
Mouvement: Since the 1980s, the kind of sociology that you have endorsed has 
been characterized as ‘pragmatic’. In On Critique2 you use this term to refer 
to the orientation of the individual and collective works that have been 
produced by members of the Groupe de Sociologie Politique et Morale 
(GSPM), of which you are the founder. Has linguistic pragmatism been an 
important source of inspiration in your work? 
 
Luc Boltanski: To begin with, I would like to stress that the notion that our 
project can be characterized as ‘pragmatic sociology’ is a view that, initially, 
  
 
has been expressed not by members of the GSPM – and, above all, not by me 
– but by people outside our research group. Personally, I have never sought to 
identify my empirical studies with a particular – clearly defined – theoretical 
approach. Rather, I conceive of theoretical work as a never-ending endeavour, whose 
flaws should by no means be concealed. This reluctance on my part is, to a large 
extent, due to the fact that I am well aware of the harmful effects of a certain 
sociological dogmatism which was common in the late 1970s and which meant 
that some scholars, regardless of their object of study, had a tendency to base 
their analyses on a Bourdieusian conceptual framework, which in fact was 
much less rigid than its overly schematic applications may suggest. 
Yet, in response  to  your  question,  I  wish  to  emphasize  that  pragmatism 
– especially linguistic pragmatism, by which I was heavily influenced in the 1980s, 
as well as different pragmatist currents in American sociology, which were 
inspired by philosophical pragmatism – has played a pivotal role in the 
development of my work over the years. The example of linguistics, which – 
according to some ‘purists’ – is used in a rather metaphorical way, is 
omnipresent in the kind of  approach that I have  sought to propose. This, I 
think, is pretty obvious in my recent book On Critique. By the way, this is one 
of the reasons why I decided to dedicate the book to my brother Jean-Élie, 
who is a linguist and from whom I have learned the few things I know about 
this area of research. 
 
Mouvement: To what extent have you, when revising your approach, drawn 
upon Pierre Bourdieu’s key conceptual tools, such as ‘habitus’, ‘field’, and 
‘capital’? 
 
Luc Boltanski: The paradox is that, when working with Bourdieu on a daily 
basis for seven years – between 1969 and 1975 – at the Centre de Sociologie 
Européenne (CSE, founded by Pierre Bourdieu), I was – if I may say so – less 
‘Bourdieusian’ than the others: whilst working with him, I witnessed the genesis 
of his conceptual tools, to which I added my grain of salt whenever I was able 
to do so. I was exposed to processes of trial and error, as well as to constant 
revisions, which are part of research. As a consequence, I never regarded his 
concepts as ‘frozen’ or ‘finalized’. In effect, I collaborated with someone who, 
in terms of his instruments and interpretations, was much more flexible and 
eclectic than one may think when considering his theoretical framework and the 
works of his disciples: he adored Sartre and Nietzsche; he had read Austin and 
Goffman with passion; he was very interested in ethnomethodology… 
I was in the process of putting together a conceptual framework, which was 
still in the making. For me, for example, the concept of habitus has always been 
both  interesting  and  contentious.   I  would  say  that  this  concept  responds 
  
 
to a very important sociological problem: how can we combine two levels  of 
analysis, which are usually kept separate from one another, namely ‘the 
phenomenological level’ and ‘the structural level’, ‘the micro’ and ‘the macro’? One 
may suggest that the concept of habitus permits us to shift from the world as it 
appears ‘within’ situations – in which actors perform and are inventive, creative, 
and unique – to the world considered from an ‘external’ position, highlighting the 
logic of  reproduction, constraint, and structures. Furthermore, the concept  of 
habitus enables us to account for the existence of a dominant class, which 
defends its interests and which shares a set of values and forms of action, 
thereby avoiding the reductive implications of conspiracy theories.3 
It seems to me, however, that the concept  of  habitus  derives  largely from 
cultural anthropology, which constitutes the first disciplinary approach to 
problematizing the relationship between the ‘character’ of individual subjects 
and the ‘character’ of the culture in which they find themselves situated. What 
I have in mind in this regard are, for instance, Ralph Linton’s The Cultural 
Background of Personality4 or Ruth Benedict’s Patterns of Culture.5 Bourdieu took up 
this issue, applying it to the question of social classes. 
I am sceptical of the view that it is possible to isolate ‘cultures’ neatly by 
attributing a distinct ‘character’ to them, particularly in the context of modern 
occidental societies. More importantly, it seems to me that what continues to 
be deeply problematic about the concept of habitus is the fact that it fails to 
do justice to the uncertainty that is built into social life. Within the group of 
sociologists with whom I developed my ideas in the 1970s, the concept of 
habitus used to be employed in order to explain behavioural patterns. It would 
give sociologists the authority to say: ‘Sure, that’s why!’ Yet, this position 
underestimates the significance of other factors that play a vital role in the 
unfolding of social life, especially the factors that depend on the structure of the 
situation, analysed so brilliantly by Erving Goffman. It is precisely the existence 
of a multiplicity of reasons that can be invoked to attribute meaning to ‘what is 
happening’, reasons that are – obviously – context-dependent. 
 
Mouvement: Are you suggesting that the tendency to underestimate the 
uncertainty inherent in social life is due to the reductive use of the concept of 
habitus, understood as an explanatory template, rather than due to the concept 
itself ? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Without a doubt, my reservations are related to the ways in 
which the concept of habitus can be, and has been, misused. In a more general 
sense, however, it seems to me that my approach differs fundamentally from 
the works carried out by members of the Centre de Sociologie Européenne, 
notably in terms of my understanding of sociological research. I would go 
  
 
so far as to assert that their conception of science was ‘Newtonian’, which was 
based on the conviction that scientific activities are aimed at reducing uncertainty. 
According to my own perspective, by contrast, one of the main tasks of 
sociology is to demonstrate the importance of uncertainty in social life. On this account, 
science should not seek to ‘reduce’ contradictions, but it should contribute to 
making them visible and to illustrating how people come to terms, or fail to 
come to terms, with these contradictions. 
 
Mouvement: Are there any studies, or any particular research objectives, that 
have triggered these divergences? 
 
Luc Boltanski: One of the crucial paradigmatic turns was my research on 
cadres.6 Before this shift, an important aspect of the way in which I worked 
with Bourdieu was not to take objects as they presented themselves in the 
social world, but to construct, and thus select, certain elements in the field  in 
accordance with a particular research question in mind. The major risk 
involved in this process is that one finds what one has been searching for from 
the beginning. Similarly, when one embarks upon a research project based 
upon coding, one has, to a large extent, already produced the results. 
For example, when I worked with Pascale Maldidier on journals such as Science 
et vie and Psychologies, we constructed an object defined as ‘the journals of average 
culture’.7 Hence, we created a concept founded on a hypothesis concerning 
scientific vulgarization adjusted to a sociological theory of the middle classes. 
In the research I conducted on the cadres, on the other hand, I proceeded 
differently. The emergence of this research topic was partly accidental, because 
I had acquired an interest in the situation of self-taught cadres working for IBM 
and, suddenly, being exposed to the experience of being made redundant. I 
became aware of the extreme social and professional diversity of these cadres, 
and I was confronted with the difficulty of having to define them. Therefore, I 
was faced with the task of developing a genealogy of the constitution of a social 
group. I had to distance myself from the sociological approach inspired by the 
concept of habitus, for the simple reason that the diversity of the people I was 
studying was by no means reducible to a shared habitus. 
Of  course, I was dealing with a socially constructed group, but it was  not 
constructed through the deductive process of sociological analysis. In other 
words, I did not embark upon my research with a clear definition of     a ‘real 
group’ in mind, whose constitution would fit a scheme of sociological 
categories (for instance, ‘the self-taught engineers’, who share a career and  a 
relatively homogenous habitus). Rather, I was examining the constitution of a 
social group that existed in the empirical world and whose mode of existence 
was  not  structured  by  a  habitus.   It  was  important  to  understand 
  
 
the extent to which this social group, at once, did not exist (constituting the 
result of a political construction process) and did exist (because cadres can be 
categorized as cadres on the basis of their common interests, associations, etc.) 
 
Mouvement: This sounds like a phenomenological interpretation of the world: social 
reality exists to the extent that human actors attribute meaning to this reality? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, but it also expresses a political – or, if you prefer, Marxist – 
stance: the point was to take Marx’s famous aphorism according to which 
‘men make their own history’ seriously. This is why I traced the emergence of 
this group back to the struggles of 1936, to the formation of trade unions, and 
to certain transformations of capitalism. The idea was to explore the genesis 
of these groups, not by using categories that were external to them, but by 
studying how these groups defined themselves. From a methodological point of view, 
this was not particularly original, but, compared to what was being done at the 
Centre de Sociologie Européenne during that time, it was a different way of 
doing research. It was also during this period that I began to take an interest 
in the concepts of ‘affair’, ‘dispute’, and ‘denunciation’. This interest was 
sparked not only by the conflicts experienced by the cadres that had been made 
redundant by their companies, but also by the way in which it was possible to 
draw analogies between their stories and the crises, conflicts, and processes 
of exclusion that were taking place in my own work environment in the mid-
1970s. 
It was because of both this fieldwork and my personal experience that I 
often thought that I could have conducted an enquiry into the dynamics of 
dissidence taking place within particular social groups. One example was the 
Communist Party, notably the role of its dissidents and of those members who 
were excluded from it. In fact, this is an issue in which I continue to    be 
interested: how a world that – from within – is experienced as a realm    of 
solidarity and enchantment can change dramatically and be converted into a 
world that – from outside – is perceived as a realm of violence and exclusion. 
What is particularly important in this regard is how dissidents can shift from 
participating in a logic of exclusion to denouncing this very same logic. 
 
Mouvement: Your article on denunciation appeared in 1984.8 This was the year 
in which you contributed to the creation of the Groupe de Sociologie Politique 
et Morale. Was this a ‘programmatic’ piece of work? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes and no. When I wrote this article on the boundaries 
between socially acceptable  denunciations of injustice and those regarded as 
  
 
‘abnormal’ (for instance, ‘paranoiac’), I saw this as a way of complementing, 
rather than contradicting, the studies carried out on the weight of class- 
specific differences in agenda-setting processes. This was an era in which – at 
the beginning of François Mitterrand’s presidency – the Lois Auroux were 
introduced – that is, a series of  laws that radically changed labour policies  in 
France, especially in the sense of a greater participation of workers in 
corporate decision-making processes and with the ‘creation of the right of 
employees to express their opinions about their working conditions’. I sought 
to demonstrate that, in addition to the social inequalities influencing people’s 
right to freedom of speech, there were norms which impacted upon the 
denunciation of injustice. 
As for the GSPM, it was not created directly as an autonomous research 
centre with proper funds; at the beginning, it was simply a small research 
group within the CSE, amongst whose members were Laurent Thévenot, 
Alain Derosières, Michael Pollak, and others. One of its key ambitions was to 
study the normativity of social life; hence the description ‘moral sociology’, which 
was also a reference to the works of Albert Hirschman, in particular to his 
small book L’économie comme science morale et politique [The economy as a moral 
and political science],9 which was published in 1984. 
 
Mouvement: Recently, in Rendre la réalité inacceptable [Making reality 
unacceptable]10 and in On Critique,11 you appear to have focused on the 
possibility of cross-fertilizing two crucial aspects of your research career:  on 
the one hand, the ‘critical sociology’, advocated especially by members of the 
CSE; on the other hand, the ‘pragmatic sociology of critique’, which you have 
developed at the GSPM. As you have demonstrated, one of the chief questions 
at the heart of both critical theory and critical sociology concerns the 
acceptance of domination by  the dominated themselves. The concepts  of 
‘false consciousness’, ‘alienation’, ‘illusion’, and ‘misrecognition’ have been 
employed by these intellectual traditions, in order to explain the social 
processes that make this acceptance possible in the first place. You  seem    to 
suggest that these concepts fail to do justice to the critical capacity of the 
dominated groups of society. Yet, how is it possible to account for the acceptance 
of social order? This appears to be a question that you do not really address 
in your latest works. Given the relative unity of the dominant groups, the 
fragmentation of the dominated groups may be the reason for the absence of 
revolt, but hardly for their willingness to confirm the legitimacy of a particular 
social order – for example, by  voting conservative. How can we develop     a 
theory of domination without drawing upon the concept of  alienation? In  a 
way, this question may suggest that we need something along the lines of a 
‘pragmatic sociology of domination’. 
  
 
Luc Boltanski: It is true that this is a very complicated problem, upon which I 
touch only very briefly in On Critique. An underlying theme of the book – a 
theme which is so complex that it could be regarded as an object of study in its 
own right – is the relationship between people’s acceptance of domination and 
their demand for relative coherence. It is difficult to live within contradiction, 
within revolt. There are, of course, forces that make us believe in coherence, 
and there are political managers who promise people that the realization of 
this coherence is entirely possible. In the world of labour, one can understand 
people’s acceptance of domination in relation to their need for coherence. When 
someone does a contract job of which he or she disapproves, simply to earn a 
living, he or she will start realizing that something is not quite right, that the 
whole thing does not make much sense, that it is meaningless. If he or she 
continues with this job for a few years, however, he or she may come to the 
conclusion that it is not so bad after all and that, in fact, his or her work 
contains some interesting dimensions. The reason for this is that it is impossible 
to live within permanent contradiction. 
 
Mouvement: Are you implying that we are dealing with some kind of 
‘realism’? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, in a certain way, ‘realism’ would be a way of redefining 
‘illusion’ from a point of view which would make sense to actors themselves. 
If one characterizes their behaviour by referring to ‘illusion’, one makes 
somewhat problematic assumptions about them: one tells people that they are 
beautiful, and they believe it; one fakes something, and they believe that it is 
true; and so on and so forth. It seems to me, however, that we should examine 
how people construct good reasons that enable them to attribute coherence to 
their world and, furthermore, how, when exposed to reality, they select elements 
that appear to make sense. Similar to Herbert Marcuse, I think that people 
become ‘one-dimensional’ in order to live coherent lives – that is, in order to 
survive. To my mind, sociology needs to shed light on these constructions, 
which allow for a sense of order. It needs to do so, though, without imposing a 
sense of order upon people that they have never developed themselves. What 
we need is a science of imperfect constructions of order, a science of assemblages. 
 
Mouvement: The question of people’s participation in the construction  of 
social orders is intimately interrelated with the question of the difference 
between the knowledge generated by ordinary actors and the knowledge 
produced by sociologists – that is, with the question of the epistemic distinction 
between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’. Undeniably, this has 
always been a central issue in sociological thought, notably in terms of the 
  
 
significance it attributes to the concept of critique. How do you make sense of 
the relationship between ‘ordinary knowledge’ and ‘scientific knowledge’ in 
your current work? 
 
Luc Boltanski: I think that, in many respects, the work of the sociologist is very 
similar to that of the linguist: we are confronted with task of shedding light on, 
reconstructing, and systematizing what people live through and what they know, 
or what they think they know, on the basis of their experiences. From a political 
point of view, my approach is close to Proudhon’s way of engaging with society. 
For Proudhon, the task of the ‘revolutionary theoretician’ is to ‘extract explicitly 
from the practices of social classes the implicit ideas inherent in their actions’, 
as Pierre Ansart has so brilliantly put it in a study dedicated to The Sociology of 
Proudhon.12 We are, however, dealing with a ‘dialectic’ to the extent that human 
practices are shaped by their theoretical representations. This perspective is  
developed, with great clarity, in De la capacité politique des classes ouvrières [On the 
political capacity of the working classes],13 published after Proudhon’s death. In 
a certain way, the early Frankfurt School offered a theory of knowledge that goes 
in the same direction, assuming that there is an intimate connection between 
people’s construction of knowledge and their experience of the world. For 
instance, this presupposition underpins Max Horkheimer’s famous distinction 
between ‘traditional theory and critical theory’.14 
Yet, reality is not exclusively shaped by experiences; it is also constructed 
through sets of structures put in place by societies, as illustrated, for example, 
in the creation of a nation-state. Even if it may escape the horizon of direct 
experience, the nation-state is involved in the unfolding of people’s everyday 
lives. In a small village of Lozère, inhabitants are exposed to the consequences 
of political and economic decisions that are taken far away from them; the post 
office is closed because of European policies, their agriculture is subsidised 
by the state, and they buy products made in China – to mention just a few 
examples. This is why sociology must not abandon the task of engaging with 
the level of experiences and singularities as well as with the level of structures and 
totality. One of the initial projects proposed by the sociology of critique was, 
in a sense, to reconstruct critical theory by going in a direction taken by the 
early Frankfurt School, a paradigmatic direction at whose heart lies the dialectic 
between the reality of singularity and the construction of totality. 
 
Mouvement: What do you mean by ‘singularity’? People’s singular 
experiences? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, that’s right. For instance, working on the sociological role 
of critique,  I  have  tried  to  demonstrate  how  actors  search  for  elements 
  
 
in singular experiences that enable them to call reality into question. 
Furthermore, I have explored how they are obliged to draw upon these 
experiences in relation to other situations and thereby immerse themselves in 
construction processes that force them to take the point of view of totality. In 
order for this to happen, they have to create equivalences. It seems to me that a 
‘just’ critique, which is not only effective but also adapted to its object, is what 
allows for this link between singularity and totality. 
The criticisms that are concerned with drawing our attention to singular 
cases (for example, the appeal to solidarity that makes us feel touched by a 
particular ‘unhappy’ situation) do not call the social order as a whole into 
question. (By the way, this issue often makes me think of a famous phrase by 
Helder Pessoa Câmara, one of the founding figures of ‘liberation theology’: 
‘When I look after the poor, people say I am a saint; when I reflect upon the 
origins of poverty, however, they accuse me of being communist.’) By contrast, 
a criticism that jumps too quickly in the direction of totality and squeezes 
singularity into overly large forms of equivalence (for instance, someone 
cutting sugar cane in the Dominican Republic is tantamount to a postman 
working in Clermont-Ferrand) may seem powerful in the sense that it breaks 
with fragmentation and advocates mobilization on a grand scale. It quickly 
runs the risk, though, of losing its sharpness to the extent that actors no longer 
recognize their own experiences, which are always singular, in critical 
discourse. This is how hypocrisy comes into existence. In fact, without having 
to go very far, consider the hypocrisy of the French Communist Party in the 
1950s–1970s, which, whilst fearing the fragmentation of the working class, 
made every effort to ignore the specificity of the experiences that women had 
of their position in society. 
 
Mouvement: It appears that the relationship between singularity and totality 
intersects with another key issue, which is of crucial importance when 
reflecting upon the role that social critique plays within sociology: the 
relationship between immanence and transcendence. Inspired by the critical studies of 
the Frankfurt School, in many cases mainly by Adorno’s Negative Dialectics,15 
many works focus on the contradictory position of the sociologist, who, in 
order to contribute to social criticism, aims to adopt a position of exteriority or 
transcendence vis-à-vis the human world, whilst, as a historically situated subject, 
being trapped in the contradictions of his or her environment. One gets the 
impression that you have not really engaged with the issues arising from this 
debate. 
 
Luc Boltanski: That’s true, and I would say that this is due to my scepticism 
towards certain ways of using social theories of knowledge, notably in relation 
  
 
to frameworks that rely on some kind of ‘scientific reflexivity’ when analysing 
knowledge-producing processes. For instance, I have never been convinced by 
the plea for a self-critical analysis in sociology or by ego-anthropology, both 
of which are founded on the assumption that one cannot dissociate oneself 
from social frameworks and from one’s experiences. From this perspective, 
one cannot talk about the Bambara people; all one can confidently talk about 
is one’s relation to them. I have always disliked the slightly narcissistic dimension 
of these ‘reflexive’ approaches, but perhaps this scepticism explains my social 
aversions…and maybe even my personal aversions! 
On a more serious note, I think that the analogy between sociology and 
psychoanalysis, which often underlies this kind of stance, is erroneous. Sociology 
is not synonymous with a kind of psychoanalysis that takes social positions into 
account. It is improper when (as is the case in psychoanalysis with this ceremony 
of initiation, to which Lacanians refer in terms of ‘the pass’) professors – who, 
in relation to their students, occupy a position of power – give themselves the 
right to be the tutors and judges of the self-reflexive work that their students 
are supposed to accomplish themselves. 
 
Mouvement: When taking an interest in the fact that all epistemic processes are 
embedded in socio-historical horizons, one does not necessarily have to 
perform a self-critical analysis in order to reconstruct one’s socio-biographic 
trajectory and situate oneself reflexively in relation to a particular object of 
study. Rather, this interest in epistemic processes implies that one aims to shed 
light on the normative, and historically specific, reference points on the basis 
of which one constructs objects of knowledge. This reflexive task, though, is 
not really a starting point in the studies carried out by the GSPM, is it? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Well, I do endorse a form of reflexivity, but certainly not in the 
sense of a self-critical analysis of the researcher. Self-objectification can be 
interesting in itself, but I do not consider it to be a precondition for research. In 
a sense, I rather defend the importance of a ‘laboratory’ in the social sciences – 
that is, the ensemble of methodological procedures, tools, and constraints 
which stand in the way of a pure and simple projection of desire. 
 
Mouvement: On Critique is the product of a series of lectures which, upon 
invitation by Axel Honneth, you delivered at Frankfurt. Interestingly, though, 
this book project appears to be motivated by an attempt to open a dialogue with 
the critical sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, rather than with the contemporary 
works of the Frankfurt School. In recent years, you have engaged in numerous 
discussions with Axel Honneth. To what extent has his theory of recognition16 
been a source of inspiration for you? 
  
 
Luc Boltanski: I have had various remarkably fruitful exchanges with 
Honneth, but I would stress that our starting points are different. It seems    to 
me that his theories draw upon a form of ‘communitarian anthropology’. 
According to this approach, community is inherent in human beings, and the 
existence of a communitarian spirit precedes the existence of any mode of 
social agency. Honneth’s starting point is ‘recognition’, of which he conceives 
as a kind of anthropological given and which, for him, constitutes the basis 
upon which society is constructed. The starting point of On Critique, by 
contrast, is a double uncertainty built into community life. 
Let us imagine the following situation: I am fishing in a river, some children 
are paddling, farmers discharge liquid manure, and ecologists take samples. 
At some point, the situation becomes untenable, it becomes indefensible. 
Consequently, we enter what I describe as a ‘metapragmatic regime’, in the context 
of which actors, forced to step outside the daily rhythm of mere practice, 
undertake qualifying operations, reflected in their assessments and justifications. 
Thus, they aim to make judgements about people and about what is happening 
around them. Most of the time, this kind of operation is delegated to an 
institution – that is, to a bodiless being that says: ‘This is a fishing river’, ‘This 
is a pool for kids’, and so on and so forth. This is where the first uncertainty 
emerges: What needs to be done? Who is who? Conversely, the second 
uncertainty is due to the fact that the spokespersons of the institution involved 
have bodies and that, therefore, they can be suspected of being ordinary 
individuals, who speak from their own point of view. 
Hence, contrary to Honneth’s framework, my approach examines human 
beings in terms of dispersion and uncertainty, seeking to understand how they 
develop tools and strategies which enable them to reduce this fragmentation 
and this indeterminacy. There is a second point of divergence between 
Honneth and myself, which is more political in character: it appears that, unlike 
me, Honneth attributes primary importance to legal recognition, which is 
epitomized in the state. He starts with quasi-natural groups whose presence 
precedes the existence of recognition and which require the state to put in place 
recognition procedures. In my own work, on the other hand, I am concerned 
with egalitarian modes of action that can be located outside the sphere of the 
state. 
 
Mouvement: Well, you talk about the act of recognition in terms of a socio- 
ontological presupposition. One may suggest, though, that similar criticisms 
may be levelled against your ‘pragmatic sociology’, since it conceives of people’s 
critical and moral capacities as some kind of anthropological given or invariant. 
How do you situate yourself in relation to normative approaches – notably in 
political theory and in the sociology of social movements – which, instead 
  
 
of regarding people’s critical capacity as their starting point, focus on political 
processes of empowerment – that is, on practices through which collectively 
organized actors not only mobilize their critical capacity but also generate a 
‘power to act’? 
 
Luc Boltanski: This is not contradictory. Collective tools for protest rely upon 
people’s critical capacities and upon their latent indignations, without which 
it would be difficult to understand from where these tools actually derive. You 
can see this, for instance, in the case of the sociology and anthropology of 
resistance.17 Resistance stems from individual experience, expressing a 
disagreement with reality as it is historically constructed within a given social 
formation. This experience, which escapes the frameworks of a constructed 
reality, is what I call ‘the world’, in the sense of ‘everything that happens’ – to 
use a phrase coined by Wittgenstein. It is always on the basis of experiences 
that the force of  action is formed. It is precisely the task of  political work  to 
allow for the formulation and coming together of these experiences, but 
without erasing their singularity. An experience that is no longer singular is no 
longer an experience at all. It is just a watchword. 
 
Mouvement: What, if anything, can a sociology that regards people’s ‘critical 
capacity’ as its starting point say about persons who are considered to be 
‘incapable’, such as ‘mad’ people? 
 
Luc Boltanski: This is one of numerous questions I would like to reconsider. In 
the article ‘La dénonciation’,18 I grappled with the concept of normality and 
also with the test of normality [épreuve de normalité]. It is true that this 
concern was then abandoned in On Justification:19 how is it possible to identify 
a so-called ‘normal’ personality? This question touches on the issue regarding 
the need for coherence, which I mentioned earlier. So-called ‘normal’ persons 
know that the world is not coherent. In order to be able to live without too 
many problems, however, they act as if the world were coherent (in the sense of 
‘I know, but nonetheless’, formerly analysed by Octave Mannoni). 
I am currently writing a strange book on the simultaneous birth of sociology, 
the detective or espionage novel, and paranoia as a recognized psychiatric 
issue, in terms of their relationship with the nation-state’s attempt to become 
the guarantor of reality.  For  example, according to Emil Kraepelin – who,  in 
a certain way, may be regarded as the inventor of this mental illness – the 
‘mad’ is the one who fails to stop the enquiry.20 And the so-called ‘normal’ 
person is the one who is capable of satisfying herself with reality – that is, 
with reality as it is socially constructed and as it is represented in official 
declarations. Reading this psychiatric literature from the late nineteenth and 
  
 
early twentieth centuries, one can only be struck by the analogy between ‘the 
mad’ and ‘the critical’. One gets the impression that, in various descriptions 
of ‘the mad’, it is ultimately ‘the critical’ – that is, the social critic – who is 
the main suspect. Two of Kraepelin’s French disciples, the doctors Serieux 
and Capgras, do not hesitate to compare the paranoiac with a ‘daydreaming 
sociologist’, who, ‘owing to his or her penetrating clear-sightedness, knows 
how to separate truth from secret relations between things, where others see 
only fate or coincidences’.21 Behind the portrait of the mad person hides the 
phantasm of ‘the anarchist’ or ‘the nihilist’, who has played a pivotal role in 
European literature in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
 
Mouvement: Reflecting upon the roles of the sociologist, the social critic, and 
the mad person, all of whom are interested in the ‘secret relations between 
things’, we would like to discuss one of the key elements underlying the 
theoretical architecture of On Critique. You suggest that one of the principal 
functions of institutions is to stipulate what ‘is’ – that is, to define and construct 
the frameworks and formats of reality (for instance, ‘this is a seminar’, ‘this is 
a fishing river’, etc.). According to your account, one of the central functions 
of critical activity, by contrast, is to challenge these identitarian relations (along 
the lines of ‘you call this a…?’). Moreover, your seminar series at the EHESS 
in 2010–2011 focuses on conflicts concerning the imputation of facts and 
actions. Are we – when attributing causes to situations and events, and when 
contesting these attributions – dealing with another version of the relationship 
between institutions and critique? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, the work of attribution is central to the role of institutions, 
especially to that of legal institutions. I recently went to see a fascinating film 
on this issue: Cleveland versus Wall Street.22 Twenty-one banks are taken to court 
and held responsible for foreclosing properties and thereby harming 
Cleveland. In this case, the main challenge is to find out who and what the 
causes are of what happened; one of the roles of law is to design instruments 
in order to make attributions; criticism repudiates the attributions that may 
have been assigned. 
The experience of so-called ‘ordinary’ persons is based on happenings. 
These happenings have an immediate significance (for instance, ‘this building 
has collapsed’). In order to ‘attach meaning’ to them, however, one has to 
associate them with an entity. These entities can have different orders. It may 
have to do with ‘the force of nature’ (for example, with an earthquake and, in 
other societies, with supernatural forces), and with individual human actors or 
collective entities. But these can be the object of different, more or less 
legitimate, imputations, according to which we are dealing with entities that 
  
 
have been legally predefined (for example, ‘University Paris VIII’) or with 
entities that I call ‘narratives’, such as ‘reactionaries’. The former have clear 
features and are subject to rules that define membership or non-membership, 
whereas the latter remain blurred. Similar to the role of sociology,  the role  of 
critique often consists in modifying imputations by attributing the cause  of 
certain events to entities that are not legally constituted but which contain 
narratives (‘a social group’, ‘a network’, etc.). This operation has always an 
illegitimate dimension, in the sense that the norms that it has to respect in 
order to become acceptable are very strict. As far as I know, however, until 
now these norms have hardly been explored. One easily gets accused of 
constructing ‘theories of conspiracy’. 
 
Mouvement: In On Critique, you draw an analytical distinction between 
‘radical critique’ and ‘reformist critique’. According to your distinction, 
‘reformist critique’ calls into question the way in which ‘reality tests’ take place 
(for example, a recruitment process that is supposed to be egalitarian is accused 
of being discriminatory), whereas ‘radical critique’ – formulated within what you 
call ‘the world’, in the sense of ‘everything that happens’ – calls into question 
the reality of reality, asserting that another reality is possible (for instance, the 
abolition of wage earning). Why do we need the concept of ‘the world’ in 
order to make sense of ‘radical critique’? Is it not due to the contradictions 
within reality itself that ‘radical critiques’ emerge? 
 
Luc Boltanski: The concept of ‘the world’ permits us to overcome the aporia of 
constructivism. The notion of ‘the social construction of reality’ implies that 
realityismaintainedonthebasisof abackground, which– asyourightlyobserve– I 
propose to call ‘the world’. It is by grasping certain elements in the world 
which reality fails to take into consideration that it is possible to illustrate the 
arbitrary character of reality. Amongst the references that have served as a 
basis for my argument are, as I should point out, Ovid’s Metamorphoses, a 
world in which anything can happen,  which  is  incessantly  changing, and 
which is in a constant state of flux. Yet, since one cannot live within 
permanent flux, one stabilizes the world with reality. In a certain way, this 
reality-creating process removes elements from the world. To be sure, this 
constructed reality is at the same time partial [partielle] and biased [partiale], in 
the sense that it tends to reinforce asymmetrical distributions, owing to its 
resistance to change. Given that reality does not incorporate the world into its 
totality, which remains always in part inaccessible, critique, which draws 
upon experience and which reflects a partial engagement with the world, is 
capable of calling the reality of reality into question and of uncovering its 
fragility. 
  
 
Socio-political realities that pride themselves on their robustness can 
quickly break up when the constitutive elements of a particular order cease to 
hold together. Just think about events such as the débâcle of 1940, as you find it 
described in many stories, or – somewhat closer to us – the weeks of strike in 
May 1968, when the quasi-absence of power and the accumulation of piles of 
rubbish on street corners, going hand in hand with the calling into question of 
the principal format of tests [formats d’épreuve] in the areas of the school, the 
work place, the arts, the family, sexuality, and gender-based identities. 
 
Mouvement: Is reality a normative structure of the world? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, reality contains principles of justice and what, in On  
Justification,  Laurent  Thévenot  and  I  call  ‘tests’  [épreuves].  Tests  can  be 
conducted more or less smoothly. In their concrete application, they can 
conform – roughly – to their format. Hence, one can make reference to reality 
in order to criticize what is happening and in order to improve it, but one can 
also change reality by drawing upon elements from the world. These elements 
take the form of singular experiences, which become critical political elements 
through the construction of equivalences. As I have just mentioned, however, these 
equivalences, in order to serve the cause of critique, have to preserve the trace 
of singularities that they bring forward within a given set of relations. In a way, 
this is what distinguishes the role of critique from the role of institutions. A 
specificity of critical speech and action is that they cannot be institutionalized; 
indeed, if you allow me to make this normative judgement, they should not be 
institutionalized. Yet, this does not mean that critique should not be organized. 
In my work, I aim to propose an analytical distinction between ‘institutions’ 
(whose role is, primarily, a semantic one by ‘saying what is’) and ‘organizations’ 
(which ensure tasks of coordination). 
 
Mouvement: From the point of view of contemporary sociology, what is 
unusual about this distinction between ‘reality’ and ‘world’ is the underlying 
assumption that the world is not always already permeated by horizons of 
interpretation and perception, which we create in our encounter with reality. 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, this is a standpoint that a positivist sociologist could 
criticize by describing it as ‘metaphysical’. The world is not characterized as 
either social or non-social. It is pure immanence; what happens, and the way in 
which one interprets what happens, forms part of what happens. A tsunami  is 
also part of the world. It turns social when, for instance, one blames human 
causalities on the authorities’ lack of preparation. I once presented the book to 
a group of normaliens, and one of them, a Jesuit,  asked me if he could include 
  
 
the Holy Spirit in the world. I do not have any problem with this: you can 
include anything you want in the world…although, personally, I would not be 
at ease with the idea of living in a world in which some kind of divine being 
would play an important political role! 
 
Mouvement: For you, then, the term ‘world’ does not mean the same as the term 
‘lifeworld’, does it? 
 
Luc Boltanski: No, because we live – simultaneously – within reality and within the 
world. We constantly make choices within the realm of things that happen to 
us, thereby incorporating them into the format of reality. 
 
Mouvement: Let us return to the relationship between individual experience and 
collective dispute, which appears to lie at the heart of your conception  of ‘the 
political’. In a large part of the work that you have produced over the past 
twenty years at the GSPM, one gets the impression that ‘the political’   is 
defined, above all, by generalization processes [montée en généralité] and the 
appeal to common rules. In a way, this is essential to the link between ‘political 
sociology’ and ‘moral sociology’. You yourself have examined the moments in 
which individuals invoke particular principles or rules, in order to settle their 
own affairs (for instance, in the context of an inter-individual conflict within a 
company). In addition, you have studied public moments in which collective 
groups take charge of things by which they are not directly affected and, thus, 
seek to transform other people’s lives. In the various examples you give in On 
Critique, you do not draw an analytical distinction between different types of 
situation – for instance, between individual and collective mobilizations, or 
between those oriented towards individual change and those oriented towards 
social change. Are you putting forward a ‘continuist’ conception of ‘the 
political’? 
 
Luc Boltanski: Yes, by definition, this ‘continuist’ rationale requires us to 
differentiate between stages and, hence, to draw the aforementioned 
distinction between individual change and social change, by analysing the 
dynamics underlying the emergence of affairs, which are also dynamics of 
politicization. This is, for instance, the main theme of the coedited volume 
Affaires, scandales et grandes causes.23 By means of a detailed historical analysis, 
this study examines the transitions between different forms of ‘the political’. 
The concept of ‘affair’ can refer to a range of things, from a private discussion 
in an office to a big demonstration. I think it is interesting to study continuity 
as such, but we must not ignore the fact that, to some extent, affairs always 
involve the question of the state, which,  by definition, presents  itself  as  the 
  
 
guarantor of reality. This is an issue that I have not yet explored in sufficient 
detail. In a sense, an affair is always opposed to the state. It appears that this 
has always been the case, and this aspect has been scrutinized by Elisabeth 
Claverie, notably in her analysis of the way in which Voltaire takes position in 
the Affaire du Chevalier de la Barre or in the Affaire Calas.24 
 
Mouvement: Does the state play a more prominent role in your current 
research? 
 
Luc Boltanski: The book that I am trying to write at the moment looks into 
the links between the state and reality from the point of view of the detective 
or espionage novel. I am interested – principally – in the process by which, at 
the end of the nineteenth century, the nation-state progressively developed the 
exorbitant ambition to organize reality under its umbrella (a process that 
Foucault analyses in terms of ‘bio-politics’). Obviously, it is impossible to 
realize this ambition – especially because of capitalism, which is incorporated 
into the state, whilst possessing an autonomous mode of functioning. The state 
seeks to impose a more or less controllable order upon a given territory, defined 
by borders within which resides a particular population characterized as 
‘national’. Capitalism, however, is able to transcend these borders. 
Consequently, a contradiction arises, one that manifests itself in the tension 
between the logic of territory and the logic of flux. The anxiety triggered by this 
contradiction plays a hugely significant role in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries – that is, precisely when expansionist capitalism, on the 
one hand, and the nation-state’s attempt to control everything, on the other, 
are beginning to emerge. 
The thesis that I seek to defend (I say thesis, rather than hypothesis, because 
it is difficult, or almost impossible, to provide absolutely convincing evidence 
in support of this claim) is that the appearance of the detective novel, and a bit 
later – that is, during the First World War – of the espionage novel, and the 
considerable success that these genres have had ever since, are due to the fact 
that they implicitly illustrate this contradiction and the anxiety caused by it. 
The detective novel expresses this on a local level (which clashes with a state, 
a ‘peace state’, if we can call it this), whereas the espionage novel does so on 
a global level (which jeopardizes a state in wartime). In the longer term, my 
aim is to make a contribution to the study of the crisis of the contemporary 
nation-state. We are currently witnessing a period in which the nation-state is, 
at the same time, very powerful and profoundly in crisis, notably because it 
constantly loses sovereignty under the influence of the extension of capitalism, 
which is itself both extremely powerful and in deep crisis. The two crises – the 
crisis of capitalism and the crisis of the state – are obviously interrelated. 
  
 
A task of the sociology of ‘the political’ consists in analysing, on the basis 
of surveys in the present, everything that points at the possibility of 
overcoming capitalism and the nation-state. This has to be done in such        a 
way that – whilst being able to anticipate, prepare for,  and reflect upon   the 
failures of the state – we can think about the possibility of alternative forms 
of social arrangement. This is the reason why, like many other people 
nowadays, I am interested in authors who have shaped the libertarian tradition. 
In fact, it is the first tradition of thought that has sought to think about the 
possibility of social arrangements which exist beyond the logic of the state. It 
seems to me that one central problem encountered by the contemporary 
French political left is its inability to liberate itself from a quasi-sacred 
attachment to the state apparatus, as well as from its perpetual and nostalgic 
glorification of the ‘ideals’ of the Third Republic. This, I believe, is evident 
when considering those who call themselves ‘republicans’, but I also think 
that this has more general implications. What I find interesting in libertarian 
thought is its emphasis on both the critique of the state and the critique of 
capitalism, which are – as Marx had already demonstrated – historically 
related. This libertarian form of criticism is motivated by a defence of both 
individual liberties and equality. 
 
Mouvement: You are a member of the Société Louise Michel, which is close to 
the Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste [NPA; New Anticapitalist Party]. Do you 
think that the NPA is a political space that is open to libertarian thought? 
 
Luc Boltanski: I am not a member of the NPA. I have never been a member 
of a political party, and I have no intention of becoming a member of a political 
party at this stage of my life. I do think, however, that the NPA, which appears 
to be open to debate, is itself marked by the tension between republican 
tendencies and libertarian tendencies and that, furthermore, the existence of this 
tension is not an accident, considering the difficulties it currently faces. 
As far as the Société Louise Michel – which is independant from the NPA – 
is concerned, I would say that, for the time being, this is a rather small group 
of friends and colleagues – such as Philippe Pignarre, Michael Lowy, and some 
others – who, from time to time, meet in the backroom of a nice bar and who 
try to organize discussion sessions on the current tendencies of criticism and 
critical action: from the Zapatistas to the Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais 
Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil; from the Décroissants to the Mouvement Pirate; 
from Elinor Ostrom’s studies of the commons25 to the works on ‘the entrance 
of animals into politics’ – to mention only a few issues. In short, we are a 
group that organizes seminar sessions and debates  covering a vast range of 
  
 
topics, which has regular meetings of usually about sixty people, which is not 
yet anything in the way of ‘The Academy of Moral and Political Sciences’ and 
which, I hope, will never turn out to be anything along those lines… 
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